The Brilliant Incoherence of Trump’s
Foreign Policy .The United States periodically
debates whether to do more or less abroad. Trump won by promising both. But he
can’t possibly deliver.
e of Trump’s Foreign Policy
The United States periodically debates whether to do more or less abroad. Tru
very 20 years or so—the regularity is a little
astonishing—Americans hold a serious debate about their place in the world.
What, they ask, is going wrong? And how can it be fixed? The discussion,
moreover, almost always starts the same way. Having extricated itself with some
success from a costly war, the United States then embraces a scaled-down
foreign policy, the better to avoid overcommitment. But when unexpected
challenges arise, people start asking whether the new, more limited strategy is
robust enough. Politicians and policy makers, scholars and experts, journalists
and pundits, the public at large, even representatives of other governments
(both friendly and less friendly) all take part in the back-and-forth. They
want to know whether America, despite its decision to do less, should go back
to doing more—and whether it can.
The
reasons for doubt are remarkably similar from one period of discussion to the
next. Some argue that the U.S. economy is no longer big enough to sustain a
global role of the old kind, or that domestic problems should take priority.
Others ask whether the public is ready for new exertions. The foreign-policy
establishment may seem too divided, and a viable consensus too hard to
reestablish. Many insist that big international problems no longer lend
themselves to Washington’s solutions, least of all to military ones. American
“leadership,” it is said, won’t work so well in our brave new world.
With minor variations, this is the foreign-policy debate that the
country conducted in the 1950s, the 1970s, and the 1990s. And it’s the same one
that we have been having for the past few years. The rise of the Islamic State,
the Syrian civil war, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and China’s muscle-flexing
in East Asia jolted the discussion back to life in 2014. Presidential debates
in 2015 and 2016 added issues (from Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal to his
Asian trade pact) and sharpened the controversy.
Those
of us in the foreign-policy business are always glad to have our concerns get
this kind of prominence. Down the decades, these debates have tended to produce
a consensus in favor of renewed American activism. Yet each version unfolds in
its own way. The global turmoil of 2016 meant that nobody could be completely
sure how this one was going to turn out.
We
still don’t know. The advent of Donald Trump—his candidacy, his election, and
the start of his presidency—has given our once-every-two-decades conversation
extra drama and significance. Some commentators claim that Trump wants to cast
aside the entire post–Cold War order. To others, he is repudiating everything
that America has tried to achieve since 1945. Still others say he represents a
break with all we have stood for since 1776 (or maybe even since 1630, when
John Winthrop called the Massachusetts Bay Colony “a city upon a hill”).
That we talk this way is but one measure of the shock Trump’s
victory has administered. The new president is raising questions about the
foreign policy of the United States—about its external purposes, its internal
cohesion, and its chances of success—that may not be fully answered for years.
Yet to understand a moment as strange as this, we need to untangle what has
happened. In this cycle, America has actually had two rounds of debate about
its global role. The first one was driven by the 2016 campaign, and Trump won
it. The second round has gone differently. Since taking office, the new
president has made one wrong move after another. Though it’s too soon to say
that he has lost this round, he is certainly losing control of it. In each
case, we need to understand the dynamics of the discussion better than we do.
Like its predecessors, the 2016
debate began with a negative premise: America wasn’t doing well enough in the
world. In the ’50s, and again in the ’70s, the worry was that the United States
had ceded the strategic initiative to the Soviet Union. By the mid-’90s, the
U.S.S.R. was no more, but Americans came to feel that they needed a better way
of coping with the conflicts of the post–Cold War world. Existing policy did not
seem good enough.
Last
year was no different. Of the 20-odd Republican and Democratic presidential
candidates, none fully embraced the Obama administration’s version of
retrenchment. As always, the critiques varied. Some urged doing more; others,
less. Among the Republicans, the more-to-less spectrum ran from Marco Rubio to
Rand Paul (with upwards of a dozen contenders in between). Among the Democrats,
it went from Hillary Clinton to Bernie Sanders (with others in between whom no
one can remember). Candidates of both parties seemed more open than they had
been in years to the idea of rethinking what America stands for—and should be
trying to do.
